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Introduction 
It is an uncomfortable fact of life that Western legal systems do on occasions struggle in 
attempting to characterise the precise status of certain commercial relationships which do 
not require a formal designation via registration.  What the parties believe their relationship 
to be, may not be how the law treats such a nexus.  It is trite law that such relationships are 
judged in substance by the law and not by how the parties designate them.  But, even with 
that guidance to hand, resolution of commercial status is no easy matter.  This issue of 
characterisation is important because the consequences of that differential may be 
profound, affecting the rights of the parties and the tax treatment of their association.  
Uncertainty in commerce is never welcome and the law should set its face against it1.  
Examples of this phenomenon of uncertain status abound.  So, is relationship which is based 
upon the provision of labour one of employer/employee, or is the labour provider merely an 
independent contractor? This has generated much litigation in the UK in recent years2. 
A more specific illustration of the genre well known to corporate lawyers in the UK concerns 
the distinction between a fixed and floating charge over a borrowing company’s assets.  This 
in the past has caused difficulties requiring intervention from the House of Lords3.  Much of 
the steam went out of the issue with the abolition of Crown preference (which impacted 
upon floating, but not fixed, charges) by s. 251 of the Enterprise Act 2002, but as that form 
of top-slicing is now likely to make an unexpected return4 to the landscape of UK corporate 
                                                          
1   Lord Mansfield reminded us of the importance of this feature this in Vallejo v Wheeler 
(1774) 1 Cowp 143. 
2   See for instance Pimlico Plumbers Ltd v Smith [2018] UKSC 22. 
3  Nat West Bank v Spectrum Plus Ltd [2005] UKHL 41.  See Berg [2006] JBL 22. 
4   This was announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the November 2018 Budget 
Speech and a consultation is underway – see HM Treasury, “Protecting Your Taxes in 
insolvency law, one might anticipate that the fires of litigation on this dichotomy will be 
relit. 
A more general question is whether the interaction between two or more commercial 
players engaged in a collaborative venture could amount to a partnership in the eyes of the 
law.  This is a dilemma that has bedevilled jurisprudence across many legal systems for 
centuries and has not been resolved5.  This conveniently brings us to the particular subject 
matter of this essay on characterisation.  The legal connections between the institutions of 
Partnership Law and Company Law are well recorded.  Although there are major differences 
between the corporate and partnership forms, there is no doubt that the former entity 
owes a substantial debt of gratitude to the latter.  If we look at official business format 
statistics for the UK, the registered company offering limited liability to shareholders might 
be regarded as the cuckoo in the nest.  There are now estimated to more than six times the 
number of limited companies as there are partnerships.  Undoubtedly, the availability of 
limited liability to shareholders has proved to be a decisive factor in the evolution of this 
profile. That said, the purpose of this present paper is to review the current state of play 
with regard to one particular aspect of that interface, namely the phenomenon of so-called 
quasi-partnership company.  This, on a superficial level, may be seen as a hybrid entity 
combining together features from both traditions.  But, on closer analysis, all is not what it 
seems. The thesis that is presented in this article is that the quasi-partnership concept 
served an important purpose when it first appeared in English Law but that it is no longer 
necessary to achieve that goal in view of developments in other areas of Corporate Law 
specifically and English Law generally.  
 
The quasi partnership company emerges  
There are no official statistics available on the prevalence of quasi-partnerships in the UK 
and no mention can be found of them in the statutory language of the Companies Acts. 
Attempts by the Law Commission to craft a customised set of rules for the protection of 
members of quasi partnerships by introducing rebuttable presumptions of unfair prejudice 
got nowhere6.  To all intents and purposes, for official and legislative purposes they are 
therefore invisible.  We know that there are over 3 million limited companies registered in 
England and Wales at the Companies Registry.  As the vast majority (more than 98%) of 
these are private companies, we may assume that many of these may well be candidates 
suitable for being regarded as quasi-partnerships7. 
                                                          
Insolvency” (26 February 2019).  The likely change will take place for the tax year beginning 
in April 2020. 
5   See Milman [2018] 6 NIBLeJ 2 (open access) – republished in Proceedings of the Inaugural 
Conference of the Partnership, LLP and LLC Law Forum Special Print Edition 13-32 (2018, 
Nottingham Law School).  Note also Milman (1983) 4 Co Law 199. 
6   See Shareholder Remedies (LC No. 246, 1997) para 3.30. 
7   But we must not assume that every private company incorporated under English Law 
qualifies as a quasi-partnership – Smith J issued a similar caution with regard to the position 
The quasi-partnership idea appears to have first surfaced in English Company Law discourse 
through the judgment in Re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd8, an oft-cited authority dealing with 
winding up on the “just and equitable grounds”.  This precedent featured a case of a private 
company which had been incorporated in 1914 to facilitate the merger of two existing firms.  
This new company was structured on a 50/50 shareholding basis, but then the two key 
individual players (who were the only directors of this company) fell out, with the resulting 
paralysis of the merged business. In those circumstances of complete deadlock the Court of 
Appeal drew heavily upon the Scottish Court of Session precedent of Symington’s Quarries9 
as the basis for its ruling in support of granting a winding up to resolve the impasse. In the 
Court of Appeal Lord Cozens-Hardy stated that this was a partnership in the guise of a 
company and therefore it was appropriate to adopt partnership ideas on when the court 
could dissolve the relationship.  The phraseology of “quasi-partnership” was not actually 
used in the judgment in that case; that label appeared much later in reported litigation in 
the 20th century10. 
That this matter should have come to the attention of the courts at this particular time in 
the evolution of the modern corporate paradigm was no historical accident. We can well 
imagine how it came about because we saw the formal arrival of private company in in 
English Law in the Companies Act 1907.  Informally, the private company had been on the 
scene for decades prior to that date.  The quasi-partnership genre is now widely recognised 
throughout the common law world and the English jurisprudence is on the whole faithfully 
applied11.  The quasi-partnership thus appears to enjoy a global status as a form of business 
organisation.  It therefore merits some examination in depth. 
                                                          
of proprietary companies in Australia in Re Wondoflex Textiles Pty Ltd [1951] VLR 458 at 
465.   
8  [1916] 2 Ch 426.  For perceptive analysis see McPherson (1964) 27 MLR 282. See also Re 
Davis and Collett Ltd [1935] Ch 693. Compare Re Cuthbert Cooper & Sons Ltd [1937] Ch 392. 
9  [1905] 8 F 121, [1905] SLR 43-157.  The judgment here talks about a “domestic company” 
rather than a quasi-partnership.  See also Thomson v Dysdale [1925] SC 311 where the 
partnership analogy was to the fore. 
10  Clearly one could point to the speech of Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v Westbourne 
Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 at 379.  Prior to that this designation was used in the judgments 
in Charles Forte Investments v Amanda [1963] 2 All ER 940 at 951 per Cross J and Re K/9 
Meat Supplies (Guildford) Ltd [1966] 3 All ER 320 at 325 per Pennycuick J. 
11  See for instance Tay Bok Choon v Tahanson Bhd [1987] 1 WLR 413 where the Privy 
Council accepted that it represented the law in Malaysia.  On the quasi partnership in 
Ireland see Re Murph’s Restaurant Ltd [1979] IEHC 1. For the comparable position in 
Singapore see Eng Gee Seng v Quek Choon Tek [2009] SGHC 205.  The quasi-partnership is 
recognised in Hong Kong – Re Yung Kee Holdings Ltd [2004] 2 HKLRD 313. For a New Zealand 
perspective see Vujnovich v Vujnovich [1989] UKPC 21 and for Australian attitudes see Re 
Optimisation (Australia) Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 31 where the language in the judgment (e.g. 
paras [294]-[300] is that of “close company” whereas the introductory summary refers to 
quasi partnership. The quasi partnership is recognised on the Indian subcontinent and in 
Africa in those countries where the British Empire ruled.  
 
What is a quasi partnership? 
Although all commentators recognise that there is such a thing as a quasi -partnership which 
is recognised by law, this is not an easy matter to define with any degree of precision12.   As 
we will see, the quasi -partnership concept is a fluid one that operates more as an ad 
personam relationship descriptor rather than as a permanent characterisation of an 
organisation.  In Fisher v Cadman13 Sales J characterised it as a shorthand label used to 
describe a relationship into which equitable considerations might intrude.  This definitional 
question has caused difficulties ever since the concept of the quasi-partnership (however so 
described) first emerged. 
A general definition of quasi-partnership was provided by Lord Millett in CVC/Opportunity 
Equity Partners Ltd v Almeida14: 
    “Companies where the parties possess rights, expectations and obligations which are not 
submerged in the company structure are commonly described as ‘quasi-partnership 
companies’.  Their essential feature is that the legal, corporate and employment 
relationships do not tell the whole story; and that behind them there is a relationship of 
trust and confidence similar to that obtaining between partners which makes it unjust or 
inequitable for the majority to insist on its strict legal rights. “ 
Any attempt to define a quasi -partnership with more precision inevitably must confront the 
judgment of Lord Wilberforce in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd15.  His Lordship in his 
speech focused attention on three factors as relevant to this classification – (1) the 
existence of a personal relationship involving mutual confidence between the parties; (2) 
the expectation that the claimant would participate in the management of the venture and 
(3) the operation of share transfer restrictions.  
On the first criterion, a prior personal relationship might cover the situation where the 
company was incorporated on the back of an earlier partnership, but it is not restricted to 
that particular scenario16.  Family connections may be relevant here and many family firms 
may constitute quasi partnerships17.  A prior commercial interaction will not of itself be 
                                                          
12  A point acknowledged by Brightman J in Re Leadenhall General Hardware Stores Ltd 
(1971) 115 Sol Jo 202. 
13 [2006] 1 BCLC 499 at para [84]. 
14  [2002] UKPC 16 at para [32]. 
15  [1973] AC 360.  These 3 criteria were adopted by Lord Millett in CVC/ Opportunity Equity 
Partner Ltd v Almeida (supra) in a case which came to the Privy Council from the Cayman 
Islands. For academic critique of this jurisprudence see, Chesterman (1973) 36 MLR 129, 
Prentice (1973) 89 LQR 107, Rider [1979] 38 CLJ 148. 
16   When the Law Commission reviewed unfair prejudice petitions presented between 1994 
and 1996 it found that only in some 10% of cases was there a pre-existing partnership -  see 
Shareholder Remedies (LC No 246, 1997) Appendix J. 
17   See for instance Re Lagan Holdings Ltd [2008] NI Ch 23 where the assertion that a quasi-
partnership existed between family members was not contested – see para [19] of the 
sufficient to establish a prior personal relationship necessary for a quasi-partnership finding.  
On this qualification we should note the comments of Mann J in Brett v Migration Solutions 
Holdings Ltd18 to the effect that a prior arm’s length commercial relationship does not 
necessarily indicate a personal nexus.  Thus, in Wootliff v Rushton-Turner (No. 2) 19 Chief 
Registrar Briggs dismissed a s. 994 unfair prejudice petition.  He found that this company 
was based upon a purely commercial relationship lacking the personal features normally 
associated with a quasi-partnership.  There was no prior personal relationship of the type 
that triggered equitable considerations and the respective rights of the parties in the 
company had been mapped out under a professionally drawn up share purchase 
agreement. 
By comparison, by looking at Re BC & G Care Homes Ltd 20 we can see how a quasi-
partnership finding helped the court to conclude that the exclusion of a one-third 
shareholder/director from management was unfairly prejudicial.  The quasi-partnership 
finding was facilitated by the fact that the business had previously operated in partnership 
form.  In Pinfold v Ansell 21 HHJ David Cooke also had no difficulty in determining that the 
petitioner (a 49% shareholder) was in a quasi-partnership relationship with the respondent 
majority shareholder, as a previous business relationship had existed between these parties.  
A remedial order under s. 996 of the Companies act 2006 in which the petitioner was to be 
bought out was therefore made in consequence of an unfair prejudice finding. 
The personal element involved in establishing and maintaining a quasi-partnership link is 
reflected by the fact that such status can be lost by a change in the relationships within a 
company.  On this aspect we could refer to the Scottish authority of Third v North East Ice 
and Cold Storage Co Ltd22, where the subsequent creation of a formal employment 
relationship between the protagonists was found to be sufficient to undermine any 
possibility of a quasi-partnership existing or continuing.  We could also highlight the case of 
Re Sunrise Radio Ltd 23 where the petitioner had at some time in the past been a quasi-
partner, but was not so at the time the matters complained of in the unfair prejudice 
petition actually took place.  Conversely, a quasi-partnership nexus can develop between 
                                                          
judgment of McCloskey J.  In Shah v Shah [2010] EWHC 313 (Ch) the existence of a quasi- 
partnership was initially not disputed but then it became contentious; however Roth J 
confirmed its existence – see para [99] of the judgment.  But in Thomas v Thomas Ltd [1984] 
1 NZLR 686 at 695 Richardson J observed that not every family company is (or remains) 
necessarily a quasi partnership. 
18 [2016] EWHC 523 (Ch) at para [203]. 
19 [2017] EWHC 3129 (Ch), [2018] 1 BCLC 479 – note in particular paras [81]-[85].   
20 [2015] EWHC 1518 (Ch), [2016] BCC 615. 
21 [2017] EWHC 889 (Ch), [2017] 2 BCLC 489. 
22 [1998] BCC 242.  But compare the observation of the court in Quinlan v Essex Hinge Co Ltd 
[1996] 2 BCLC 417 where the point was made that the fact that a shareholder/director also 
had a service contract with the company did not rule out the possibility of him being treated 
as a quasi-partner. 
23 [2010] 1 BCLC 367.  See also Re A Company (005134 of 1986) ex parte Harries [1989] BCLC 
383. 
participators in a company much later in the day24. The alarming truth is that a particular 
company may be classed as a quasi-partnership at one point in its history, but not at other 
times. A recognition of this transient feature can be found in the judgment of HHJ Matthews 
in McCallum-Toppin v McCallum-Toppin 25.  ICC Judge Briggs commented in Michel v 
Michel26 that the quasi-partnership nexus is not static.  That should not be a difficult 
phenomenon for us as corporate lawyers to grasp, as registered companies can now convert 
from public to private status and vice versa27, though of course formal procedures must be 
adopted to achieve this transition.  Corporate metamorphosis is not unusual, but the lack of 
transparency in the quasi-partnership context is unsettling.   
Secondly, on the managerial participation issue28, it should be conceded that a quasi-
partnership might be found to operate between two individuals where one of these parties 
wished to remain as a “dormant partner” without active managerial input29.  This 
commendable open-mindedness in definitional matters itself has generated some 
confusion.  The fundamental point to bear in mind however is that we are talking about 
labels and this should not disguise the fact that a quasi-partner is still a shareholder in a 
company: for confirmation of this fundamental truth see Re Brand & Harding Ltd 30 where 
Rose J wound up a farming company on the just and equitable ground in view of the 
continuing deadlock between the participants (who were sisters).  However, there are still 
significant differences between the rules governing partners and those shareholder 
designated as quasi-partners.  This differential is clear from a comparison of the cases of Aas 
v Benham31 and O’Donnell v Shanahan32 on the duty to account for windfall profits not 
arising from the operation of the firm’s business.  The former decision exemplifies a stricter 
approach towards accountability in Partnership Law as compared to the attitude taken in 
the later Corporate Law precedent. 
                                                          
24 Croly v Good [2010] 2 BCLC 569. 
25 [2019] EWHC 46 (Ch) at para [210] per HHJ Paul Matthews. 
26  [2019] EWHC 1378 (Ch). 
27  On this transition process see Companies Act 2006 ss. 90 and 97. 
28  Of course, this right to participate in management is a partnership staple – see 
Partnership Act 1890 s. 24(5). The expectation that a quasi-partner will remain in post as a 
director was one reason why the weighted votes arrangement in Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 
1099 was upheld – see Lord Donovan at 1110-1111. 
29   On this see Re Fildes Bros Ltd [1970] 1 All ER 923 at 926 per Megarry J. 
30 [2014] EWHC 247 (Ch) at para [8] per Rose J.  Note also Harrison v Thompson [1992] BCLC 
833 where the same point was made by Knox J (at 849) in the context of valuing an excluded 
member’s interest in the company and whether equitable interest could be brought into 
play in that valuation process. 
31  [1891] 2 Ch 244. 
32  [2009] EWCA Civ 751. 
As participation in management is such an important aspect of a quasi-partnership 
relationship in most cases, the wrongful exclusion from management is most likely to be 
actionable33. 
Finally, with regard to transferability of interest, this third indicia identified by Lord 
Wilberforce very much reflects partnership orthodoxy (see Partnership Act 1890 s. 24(7))34. 
It is easily satisfied in contested litigation relating to the existence of a quasi-partnership 
nexus as all private companies place restrictions upon share transfers.  But we must remind 
ourselves such restrictions are not necessarily watertight35. 
It is important to recall that in Ebrahimi 36 Lord Wilberforce did not say that these three 
features were the only considerations relevant to the issue of definition of a quasi-
partnership37.  Nor indeed did he suggest that all of these elements needed to be present in 
order for a quasi-partnership to arise38.   Lord Wilberforce did not suggest a maximum 
shareholder number for a quasi-partnership to exist nor did he identify a minimum 
shareholding for a person claiming to be a quasi-partner.  The Law Commission in 1997 was 
more adventurous in this regard but its proposals were never implemented39. 
What is more difficult to appreciate is that it is also possible that a shareholder may be seen 
as being in a quasi- partnership relationship with another shareholder in a particular 
company, whilst other shareholders in the same entity do not enjoy that close form of 
nexus.  Quasi partnership thus describes the nature of the relationships that may exist 
within an organisation rather than characterising the organisation itself.  There has been 
some lively judicial discussion on matters related to this point.  In Re Yung Kee Holdings 
Ltd40 the Hong Kong Court of Appeal accepted that the presence of third party participators 
in the company did not necessarily rule out a quasi-partnership finding by the court.  By way 
of contrast, the position in Estera Trust (Jersey) Ltd v Singh (Re Edwardian Group Ltd)41 
Fancourt J discussed the possibility whether a quasi-partnership could exist only between 
certain participants within a particular company.  He clearly had reservations about this 
                                                          
33  On this see Roth J in Shah v Shah [2010] EWHC 313 (Ch) at para [104] per Roth J. 
34  Also reflected to some extent in s. 31. 
35   That is the lesson of the litigation that culminated in Re Coroin Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 179 
and [2013] EWCA Civ 781.  In both instances appeals from rulings of David Richards J 
reported in [2011] EWHC 3466 (Ch) and [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) were dismissed. 
36  Supra. 
37  Fisher v Cadman [2006] 1 BCLC 499 at para [84] per Sales J.  So for instance the fact that 
profits are to be disbursed via directors salaries rather than shareholder dividends might be 
a relevant consideration according to Brightman J in Re Leadendall General Hardware Stores 
Ltd  (1971) 115 Sol Jo 202. 
38 See Fisher v Cadman (supra) at para 89 per Sales J.  
39   See Shareholder Remedies (LC No. 246, 1997).  The Law Commission favoured capping 
the criteria for a quasi-partnership company at a maximum of 5 members and requiring a 
claimant to own at least 10% of the voting shares – see para 3.46. 
40  [2004] 2 HKLRD 313. 
41   [2018] EWHC 1715 (Ch).  For later proceedings on the question of valuation of the 
interests of the various parties see [2019] EWHC 873 (Ch). 
contention, but did not appear to rule it out completely – see para [134] of his judgment.  At 
the end of the day he reserved this issue for determination at a later day as is clear from 
para [139] of his judgment.  Having rejected the contention that a quasi -partnership existed 
in this instance, Fancourt J nevertheless found that some unfair prejudice had occurred and 
granted a remedy in the form of a buyout order.  The matter was revisited by HHJ Eyre QC in 
Waldron v Waldron42 and the tentative views expressed in the Hong Kong Court of Appeal 
were supported in preference to those hinted at by Fancourt J.  This must be the correct 
perspective because it would be unwise to fetter judicial discretion in relation to this 
question.  Much will depend upon the individual circumstances of each case. 
It also has been suggested to be the case that as a rule only equity (ordinary) shareholders 
can form a quasi-partnership nexus.  Thus, in Re Planet Organic Ltd 43 the court indicated 
that a preference shareholder could not, without more, establish a quasi-partnership 
relationship.  This again may be an over-generalisation, for there is authority to the effect 
that a member who has informally expected to be given a greater shareholding in a 
company in which he has invested via loans might qualify as a quasi-partner in appropriate 
circumstances, witness the approach of Marcus Smith J in VB Football Assets v Blackpool FC 
(Properties) Ltd 44.  Finally, we note that a quasi-partnership can arise within a group context 
and is not restricted to the paradigm of a small company: for confirmation of this 
observation see Oak Investment Partners XII Ltd v Boughtwood 45.  Corporate shareholders 
may in appropriate (but rare) cases have sufficient interactive capability to generate a quasi-
partnership nexus46. 
At the end of the day, whether a company embodies a quasi-partnership or not involves an 
holistic consideration by the court of all of the factors present in each individual case.  There 
is unfortunately no simple or mechanistic litmus test that can be utilised. The judge will play 
a pivotal role. 
 
Quasi partnerships and close companies: a distinction without a difference? 
                                                          
42  [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch). 
43  [2000] BCC 610. 
44  [2017] EWHC 2767 (Ch).  Note also R and H Electrical Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical Ltd [1995] 
BCC 958. 
45 [2010] EWCA Civ 23.  In this context note SCWS Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324, noted by 
Wedderburn in (1958) 21 MLR 653.  In this Scottish appeal that proceeded to the House of 
Lords Lord Keith observed (at 361) that the subsidiary company that was the focus of the 
oppression claim consisted of a quasi-partnership between its parent company and the 
petitioners 
46  See the discussion in the Hong Kong authority of Pearl Link International Ltd v Recruit Co 
Ltd [2005] HKCFI 366.  But in this case the court questioned whether a quasi-partnership can 
arise where one of the key participators in the firm is the state.  One might suggest that this 
is too narrow a view to take, particularly as state investment funds are active across the 
corporate sector. 
Before leaving this characterisation issue we should note the relationship of the quasi 
partnership concept with those entities classed as “close companies”, an American 
descriptor that is now in widespread use across the globe and one that is increasing 
supplanting the term “quasi-partnership”47.  These terms are often used interchangeably in 
corporate law discourse and it may well be that the designation of “close company” avoids 
some of the difficulties with the introduction of partnership notions. That interchangeability 
may, however, on closer analysis be a misconception as far as English Law is concerned.  It 
would be fair to say that all quasi-partnerships are close companies, but not all close 
companies are quasi- partnerships in English law.  Close companies are indisputably small 
private companies, but they may lack the personal interactive elements that trigger a quasi-
partnership relationship.48  There are more close companies in existence in the UK than 
there are quasi-partnerships49. 
 
Implications of a quasi partnership characterisation  
The main consequence of a company being labelled as a quasi-partnership is that it enables 
the court to introduce equitable considerations when analysing the relationship between 
participants within a company.  A quasi-partnership involves mutuality on the part of the 
players50.  So, for instance it might impose equitable constraints upon how voting rights are 
exercised, over and above those operating under general Company Law.  We could cite here 
Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd 51 where Foster J imposed such constraints so as to protect 
against the dilution of a minority shareholder’s interest.  A quasi partner may thus enjoy 
rights (and be subject to obligations) which do not feature in the formal constitution of the 
company or in any service contract52. 
                                                          
47   See Prentice (1983) 3 OJLS 417. 
48   On close companies in general see J.A. McCahery and E.P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate 
Governance of Non-Listed Companies (2008)(OUP) at 24 et seq.  A valuable analysis is 
provided by Rider in [1979] 38 CLJ 148. 
49   This would appear to follow from data included in the Bolton Report on Small Firms 
(Cmnd 4811, 1971).  Bolton estimated (at para 2.2) that 90% of incorporate small firms were 
close companies and it is submitted that that high figure could not represent the number of 
quasi-partnerships.  See generally Chesterman, Small Businesses (2nd ed, 1982) (Sweet and 
Maxwell). 
50   But it does not mean that each quasi partner enjoys the same level of rights.  In Quinlan 
v Essex Hinge Co Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 417 the court commented upon senior/junior quasi 
partners.  See also Shah v Shah [2010] EWHC 313 (Ch) at para [102] per Roth J. 
51  [1976] 2 All ER 268.  Reading the judgment, there is no specific finding of a quasi- 
partnership, but it is interesting to note that Foster J drew upon Lord Wilberforce’s speech 
in Ebrahimi (supra) to provide the basis for his conclusion.  Foster J seemed keen to treat 
the case on its own facts and not to develop a general principle. 
52   Note the comments of E.W. Hamilton QC in Quinlan v Essex Hinge Co Ltd [1996] 2 BCLC 
417. 
The court can also deploy judicial discretion when deciding whether it is appropriate to 
apply the strict provisions of the Companies Acts. So, for instance, it might mean that the 
standard rules on company meetings/ resolutions do not have to be met.  This concession 
has morphed into a distinct body of jurisprudence derived ostensibly from Re Duomatic 
Ltd53, but in fact having a much longer juristic lineage54.   At its heart it accepts that quasi-
partnerships are very much in substance operating domestically like partnerships, and 
therefore the strict rules of Company Law do not always have to be applied.  But that 
concession is available only if the company is solvent and creditor interests are therefore 
not in jeopardy.  That is a critical limitation upon judicial flexibility to note. 
The labelling of a company as a quasi-partnership  can also empower the courts to take into 
account contextual factors when operating the winding up on the “just and equitable” 
ground jurisdiction which is now conferred by Insolvency Act 1986 s. 122(1)(g)). This idea 
owes much to the partnership heritage55.  This was most apparent in the leading case of  
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 56 itself.  Here certain acts undertaken by controllers of 
a private company (thereby damaging the interests of a minority), acts which were 
otherwise perfectly legal under strict Company Law, were regarded as providing sufficient 
grounds to wind up a company on the just and equitable ground because the company in 
question could be regarded as a quasi-partnership. The expectations of fairness had been 
infringed and this justified judicial intervention of the most drastic kind.  For a more recent 
illustration of this approach at work in a quasi-partnership context we note Re Brand & 
Harding Ltd57 where Rose J ordered the winding up of a quasi-partnership company in the 
light of irreconcilable disputes between the participators.  There was no other practical 
solution.  Furthermore, the beauty of this remedy is that it absolves the court of the need to 
point the finger of blame at any of the protagonists and it can instead fall back on deadlock 
as a reason for ending the relationship58.  In spite of these comments we should note that a 
quasi-partnership finding will not lead the court to block the lawful exercise of majority 
powers but it may produce the conclusion that a just and equitable winding up is the only 
proper solution59. 
                                                          
53  [1969] 2 Ch 365. 
54  See Milman [2017] 46 CLW Rev 198 for an overview of the relevant jurisprudence. 
55   On the historical origins of this jurisdiction see McPherson (1964) 27 MLR 282.  
56  Supra.  Uncondoned wrongful behaviour by a quasi-partner might justify such a winding 
up – Re Worldhams Park Golf Course Ltd [1998] 1 BCLC 554 (Neuberger J).  For another 
example of the winding up jurisdiction being used where the business of a quasi-partnership 
had ceased to operate but there was a reluctance to close it down via a voluntary 
liquidation see the ruling of Scott J in Re Perfectair Ltd [1990] BCLC 423.   
57  [2014] EWHC 247 (Ch). 
58   The Scottish ruling in Jesner v Jarrad Properties Ltd [1992] BCC 807 exemplifies this 
approach. 
59   This is well illustrated by Bentley-Stevens v Jones [1974] 2 All ER 653 where an interim 
injunction to prevent the removal of a director was refused by Plowman J. 
The quasi-partnership designation can have particular resonance in the context of an unfair 
prejudice petition presented to the court under s. 994 of the Companies Act 200660.  If the 
petitioner can establish the existence of a quasi- partnership that can improve prospects of 
success to a significant degree by bringing into play considerations that might not otherwise 
apply.  The self-imposed restriction on the courts simply protecting the petitioner’s rights 
qua member in a case of alleged unfair prejudice might be relaxed. There is no absolute 
“clean hands” bar, but the behaviour of the petitioner in a quasi-partnership case is not 
completely irrelevant61. That said, it is equally clear that an unfair prejudice petition is not 
always dependent for its success upon a quasi-partnership being proved to exist as we see 
below.  The existence of a quasi-partnership may also be relevant to the consequential 
matter of remedies if the unfair prejudice petition were to succeed.  The normal remedy 
available under s. 996 is that the respondent be ordered to buy out the petitioner at “fair 
value”.  In determining what constitutes “fair value” the courts will often start from the 
assumption that a minority shareholding in a private company must be valued at a discount.  
That reflects the market position where such a shareholding is sold to a buyer on a 
consensual basis because a minority shareholding carries inevitable risks. That default rule 
will however often be disapplied if the presence of a quasi-partnership is accepted by the 
court62.  In such circumstances, valuation will usually be based on a pro rata basis, which 
improves the financial outcome for the successful petitioner63. Views here on the part of the 
courts with regard to valuation differ, but, that said, there is consensus that at the end of 
the day this ultimately is a matter for the court to determine using its discretion based upon 
the facts of each individual case. 
The facilitation of both realisation of shareholder interest via winding up and exit in the 
wake of proven unfair prejudice is important because, as Lord Hoffmann observed in O’Neill 
v Philiips 64, there is no automatic right of exit for a shareholder even in a quasi-
partnership65.   The concept of quasi-partnership is then exploited through litigation to 
produce these practical outcomes. 
                                                          
60   On this aspect see Hannigan [1988] LMCLQ 60.  In its survey of unfair prejudice petitions 
presented between 1994 and 1996 the Law Commission some 30.5% of cases featured the 
quasi-partnership issue – see Shareholder Remedies (LC No. 246, 1997) Appendix J. 
61   See the comments of Nourse J in Re London School of Electronics Ltd [1986] Ch 211. 
62   One reason for this is that the discount rule would not be applied when valuing 
partnership interests – see CVC/Opportunity Equity Partner Ltd v Almeida [2002] UKPC 16 at 
paras [41]-42] for explanation by Lord Millett. 
63 For the relevant practice here see the various approaches outlined in Re Bird Precision 
Bellows Ltd [1984] Ch 419, Strahan v Wilcock [2006] EWCA Civ 13, Irvine v Irvine (No. 2) 
[2007] 1 BCLC 445, Re BC & G Care Homes Ltd [2015] EWHC 1518 (Ch), Estera Trust (Jersey) 
Ltd v Singh [2018] EWHC 1715 (Ch) and McCallum Toppin v McCallum-Toppin [2019] EWHC 
46 (Ch). 
64 [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
65 See also para [64] in Davies v Lynch-Smith [2018] EWHC 2336 (Ch) per HHJ Hodge QC 
The recent decision of HHJ Hodge QC in Davies v Lynch-Smith66 shows that it is perfectly 
possible for the court to reject any finding of a quasi-partnership (see paras [61] and [81] of 
the judgment) in a small private company, but at the same time to conclude that there was 
unfair prejudice.  Here HHJ Hodge QC found that the unfair prejudice arose not through an 
exclusion from management (which could be a very significant ground for complaint in a 
quasi-partnership), but out of a failure to offer to buy out the petitioner on a discounted 
basis. 
As a quasi-partnership relationship is personal to individuals it is not a relationship (with 
attendant obligations) that can automatically be transmitted to a person acquiring the 
shares of one of the quasi partners, whether by voluntary transfer or transmission by 
operation of law on death67.  It may survive the insolvency of the company in which the 
relationship is housed68, but such an economic transition will affect the enforceability of 
rights which will be subordinated to those of creditors. 
What is also important to remember is that these consequences flowing from a quasi-
partnership characterisation are purely inward facing.  The fact that a company might be 
classed as a quasi-partnership cannot expose the quasi-partners to a loss of their limited 
liability privilege69.  This is a significant limiting factor in terms of the “spread” of the 
concept which is entirely “domestic” in terms of its operation. 
 
The significance of a shareholder agreements and customised arrangements 
The quasi-partnership concept has created an important methodology for a court to resolve 
domestic disputes.  But in more recent times it has been compelled to grapple with the 
implications of the advent of shareholder agreements on this question.   Such agreements 
are used to customise relationships within a private company in a way that the standard 
articles of association may not be able to achieve.  Such agreements were not common 
when the quasi-partnership concept emerged in the early days of the 20th century.  
Therefore equitable principles were introduced to combat the apparent rigidity of Company 
Law; these days that process of introducing “flexibility” is often achieved via contract. 
The courts are therefore increasingly reluctant to hold that a quasi-partnership finding can 
undermine specific contractual arrangements (whether contained in the articles of 
                                                          
66 [2018] EWHC 2336 (Ch). 
67   The Singapore Court of Appeal made this point in Ting Shwu Ping v Sconone Pte Ltd 
[2016] SGCA 65 at para [96] per Prakash JA.  The same could be said of a shareholder 
agreement as obligations undertaken therein do not pass to new members unless such 
individuals subscribe to them – see Russell v Northern Bank [1992] 1 WLR 588. 
68   See HHJ Eyre QC in Waldron v Waldron [2019] EWHC 115 (Ch) at [72]. 
69   This may be inferred from the approach taken by Lords Templeman and Oliver sitting in 
the House of Lords hearing the International Tin Council case (JH Rayner Ltd v DTI [1990] 2 
AC 418 (see at 479 and 508).  This is a significant limiting factor in terms of the “spread” of 
the concept.  It is entirely “domestic” in terms of its operation. 
association70 or a shareholder agreement).  This was apparent in the judgment of Binchy J in 
Irish case of Hamill v Vantage Resources71. If the parties have established their relationship 
through arms’ length commercial negotiations the scope for the introduction of equitable 
principles is inevitably more constrained. Conversely, informal commercial relationships 
open up the possibility of equity filling the vacuum72.   In Re Coroin Ltd 73 David Richards J 
made the point that the potential for equitable principles to intrude was limited where a 
small group of professional investors (some of whom had never met) had combined 
together in a corporate entity and had employed a shareholder agreement which unusually 
had explicit good faith commitments.  In Estera Trust (Jersey) Ltd v Singh 74 Fancourt J 
concluded (at para [159] of the judgment) that, even if a quasi-partnership had been 
present when the company was formed, it was superseded by a later shareholders’ 
agreement.  Contract thus trumps equitable considerations in this regard.  On the other 
hand, if there is a quasi-partnership relationship subsisting in reality, any sort of denial of 
that fact in a shareholder agreement is unlikely to be effective 75. 
If the constitution of the company confers special rights on a class of shareholder 
(particularly if that is a single shareholder) it is submitted that this again might deter the 
court from finding that a quasi-partnership exists.  There is no need for the court to 
intervene by adding an equitable gloss on matters already expressly provided for. 
 
Reflections  
There continue to be a number of cases in which the quasi-partnership issue has come 
before the UK courts.   As far as quasi-partnership identification is concerned it is often a 
subsidiary issue that is raised in a broader litigation context.  It is never a self-standing issue.  
Sometimes the point is conceded76; in other instances it is the subject of dispute. Whether a 
quasi-partnership nexus exists or not is really a question of mixed law and fact: an appellate 
court will be most reluctant to gainsay a first instance determination on this matter77. 
Looking at the results of these cases, one could note that outcomes are not always easy to 
                                                          
70   See Re Posgate and Denby Agencies Ltd [1987] BCLC 8, Re A Company (005685 of 1988) 
ex parte Schwartz (No. 2) [1989] BCLC 427. 
71 [2015] IEHC 195. Mann J made much the same point in Brett v Migration Solutions 
Holdings Ltd [2016] EWHC 523 (Ch) at para [64]. 
72   See here the comments of Robert Walker J in R and H Electrical Ltd v Haden Bill Electrical 
Ltd [1995] BCC 958. 
73 [2012] EWHC 2343 (Ch) at para [636].  Confirmed on appeal on other grounds in [2013] 
EWCA Civ 781. 
74 [2018] EWHC 1715 (Ch). 
75 See here the comments of Birss J in Sudicka v Morgan [2019] EWHC 311 (Ch) at para 
[193]. 
76   As in Re London School of Electronics Ltd [1986] Ch 211. 
77   Equally an appellant will be reluctant to challenge a first instance finding on such a 
determination – see Prescott v Potamianos [2019] EWCA Civ 932 at paras [50]-[51] of the 
combined judgment of the court. 
predict.  Each case is fact dependent and often the conclusion is marginal. On balance, the 
quasi-partnership contention is more likely to be rejected than accepted78, but it is by no 
means a desperate last throw of the dice. 
Measuring the scale of the issue is problemmatic.  If we look at reported litigation in the UK 
since the year 2000 we find that the quasi-partnership issue has arisen in at least 25 cases.  
But in many instances the point is not seriously challenged and the litigation instead 
develops along different lines. Intuition suggests that where the issue is contested then a 
quasi-partnership conclusion is reached in a minority of cases.  There should be no surprises 
in this statistical outcome.  It mirrors the reluctance of the courts to infer a partnership 
where the matter is in dispute79 and is part of a broader phobia against introducing 
equitable principles into commercial relationships80.   Looking at related jurisdictions, such 
as Hong Kong, the picture in terms of a judicial finding of a quasi-partnership is broadly 
similar81.  
As to why these cases continue to arise it would be easy to point to informality as the root 
cause of the problem.  That is undoubtedly a factor, particularly in family cases, but the 
quasi-partnership issue can be triggered in broader contexts. 
The quasi-partnership concept is still firmly established as a feature of UK Company Law, 
even though for the purposes of companies’ legislation it is invisible82.  It nevertheless has a 
real presence in reported case law83.  It shows that UK Corporate Law does have a significant 
case law component84 and is not wholly a creature of statute.  But in many senses, it could 
be said that it is now an unnecessary complication in modern Corporate Law.  The courts 
could now usually arrive at the desired conclusion by making use of more flexible and 
general concepts, such as “legitimate expectations”.  The watershed cases where the quasi-
partnership question arose have been overtaken by wider legal developments.  The classic 
case of Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 85 illustrates this. It is unlikely to have 
proceeded as it did had the unfair prejudice (as opposed to the narrower concept of 
“oppression”) jurisdiction been in play at the relevant time when the litigation arose.  
Alternatively, in the years to come, the judiciary might develop the point that a quasi-
partnership is a species of joint venture, and that it is, therefore, a type of relational 
                                                          
78   It was rejected by ICC Judge Briggs on the facts of Michel v Michel [2019] EWHC 1378 
(Ch). 
79   See Milman (op cit footnote 5) at 25-26. 
80   See Re BA Peters plc [2010] 1 BCLC 142 at para [21] per Lord Neuberger commenting up 
the undesirability of creating new equitable proprietary rights in relation to an insolvent 
company. 
81   See for example the outcomes in the litigation in Pearl Link International Ltd v Recruit Co 
Ltd [2005] HKCFI 366, Cosmo Solution Ltd v Wistrade Far East Ltd [2010] HKCFI 958 and in  
China Habit Ltd v Health Links Development Ltd [2018] HKCFI 1703. 
82   See Kershaw, Company Law in Context (2009) (OUP) at 613. 
83   On the emerging discrete regulation of domestic companies see Rider [1979] 38 CLJ 148. 
84   On this general issue see Milman [1990] LMCLQ 401. 
85   Supra. 
contract. If so, the views of Leggatt LJ in favour of importing a duty of good faith into such 
relationships might become more widely accepted86. The need for using the quasi-
partnership device to achieve much the same result is thus diminished. 
It could be argued that the quasi-partnership phenomenon arose out of the failure of UK 
Corporate Law to pay adequate attention to the needs of the smaller company87.  That 
criticism is less apt today with the Thatcherite reforms in the early 1980s88 and the broad 
acceptance of the “Think Small First” philosophy in official quarters89. 
The arrival on the scene of other business forms has further muddied the traditional divide 
between partnership and company.  In particular, we now have the LLP thriving in practice 
since its introduction into the UK by the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 – this is very 
much a form of entity operating like a partnership domestically but more like a company 
externally.  The LLP phenomenon has spread globally90.  There are also new types of 
customised limited partnership that have been introduced into the UK more recently91.  
These new entities are mandated by legislation and one might therefore ask why it is that 
the courts have been allowed to introduce (and then continue to apply) the concept of 
quasi-partnership on their own initiative.  Indeed, if there is a real continuing need for the 
quasi-partnership device to be deployed in English Law, should not the legislature dictate 
that?  If it were to go down that road the usage of the concept of close company might have 
some advantages. 
Returning to the present and in the absence of reform, the problem of characterisation of 
forms of commercial relationship will not go away.  The quasi-partnership conundrum is but 
one example of this phenomenon.  Resolution of this conundrum depends upon having a 






                                                          
86   See here Al Nehayan v Kent [2018] EWHC 333 (Comm).  Note also Bates v Post Office (No. 
3) [2019] EWHC 606 (QB). 
87   On this criticism (made nearly 40 years ago) see Morse and Tedd [1971] JBL 261. 
88   We could cite here the deregulatory reforms implemented by the Companies Act 1981. 
89   Most notably in the Company Law Review – see Final Report URN (01/942) at paras 1.52-
1.55 where it is described as a core policy. 
90   The LLP in some form or another has for example been adopted in Singapore (2005), 
India (2008) and Kenya (2011). 
91  For example the limited partnership for private funds – see Legislative Reform (Private 
Fund Limited Partnerships) Order 2017 (SI 2017/514). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
